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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992) and § 63-46b-16
(1988) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The relief that may be granted by the appellate court on
review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings is governed by Utah Code Ann. r § 63-46b-16(4) (1988)•
In addition to showing one or more of the many standards stated in
§ 63-46b-16(4) , the parties seeking judicial review must show
substantial prejudice.
A.

Did

the

Industrial

Commission

have

jurisdiction

to

consider UOSH's Motion For Review when the motion was filed more
than thirty days after the issuance of the underlying order? This
issue presents a general question of law which is reviewed under a
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's
decision. Niederhauser Ornamental v. Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1034
(Utah App. 1993); Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 P. 2d 369
(Utah App. 1993); King v. Industrial Commission,. 850 P.2d 1281
(Utah App. 1993).
B.

Did the Commission act without jurisdiction and err as a

matter of law when it entered the Order Granting Motion For
Extension Of Time on remand?

This issue presents subsidiary

questions of whether the Order Granting Motion For Extension Of
1

Time was an improper nunc pro tunc order, whether an extension of
time was necessary, whether § 63-46b-l(9) authorizes an extension
of time for filing a motion for review, whether UOSH established
good cause or excusable neglect for an extension of time pursuant
to Rules 6(b) and 81(d) and whether Dusty's v. Utah State Tax
Commission applies retrospectively.

In the broad view, the issue

is one of whether the Commission acted without jurisdiction and it
is therefore reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving
no deference to the agency's decision.

Niederhauser Ornamentalf

858 P.2d 1034; Krantz, 856 P.2d 369; King. 850 P.2d 1281.

The

question of whether the Commission's Order Granting Motion For
Extension Of Time was an improper nunc pro tunc order is similarly
treated under a correction or error standard and falls into the
purview of subsections (d), (e) and (h) (iv) of § 63-46b-16. Under
subsection

(h)(iv),

the

Commission's

action

is

viewed

for

reasonableness. Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission,
860 P. 2d 944 (Utah App. 1993); La Sal Oil v. Dept. of Environmental
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah App. 1992).

Those standards also

apply to the issues of whether an extension of time was necessary,
whether § 63-46b-l(9) authorized an extension of time, whether
Rules 6(b) and 81(d) applied to require UOSH to establish excusable
neglect or good cause and whether the decision in Dusty'& v. Utah
State Tax Commission, applies retrospectively.
C.

Did the Commission err as a matter of law when it

reversed the ALJ's order and entered summary judgment against
2

Magcorp? As an issue presenting a claim of arbitrary or capricious
action, the Commission's action is reviewed for reasonableness.
Maverick, 860 P.2d 944; La Sal Oil, 843 P.2d 1045. Under section
63-46b-16(d) and (e), a correction of error standard is applied.
Niederhauser Ornamental, 858 P.2d 1034; Krantz, 856 P.2d 369; King,
850 P.2d 1281.
D.

Did the Commission err as a matter of law when it ordered

Magcorp to provide and pay for laundry services for its employees
using protective coveralls exposed to Fiberfrax without first
affording Magcorp notice and a hearing on the issue? As a question
of general law viewed under §§ 63-46b-16(b), (d) and
correction

of

error

standard

giving

Commission's decision is applied.

no

deference

(e), a
to

the

The issue may also be reviewed

under the arbitrary or capricious standard presented in subdivision
(h)(iv) of § 63-46b-16 for reasonableness. Maverick. 860 P.2d 944;
La Sal Oil, 843 P.2d 1045.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Statutes:
Utah Code Ann., § 35-9-12 (1989) (please see Addendum G for text)
Utah Code Ann. . § 63-46b-12 (1988) (please see Addendum H for text)
Utah Code Ann. , § 63-46b-16 (1988) (please see Addendum I for text)
Court Rules;
Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
(please see Addendum J for text)
Rule 81(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
(please see Addendum K for text)
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This appeal is taken from the Order Granting Motion For Review
entered by the Industrial Commission of Utah on December 17, 1992,
the Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss that preceeded the
Order Granting Motion For Review in which the Commission determined
that it had jurisdiction to review the Order and Findings And
Conclusions entered by the ALJ# and the Order Granting Motion For
Extension Of Time issued by the Commission on October 20, 1993,
after limited remand by the Court of Appeals.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH.

Petitioner, Magnesium Corporation of America

("Magcorp"),

contested a citation and notification of penalty that was issued by
the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division

("UOSH") on

September 3, 1991. Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment was heard
by the Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge for the
Industrial Commission of Utah ("ALJ")# on April 17, 1992. [R. 383450]. The ALJ ruled that the abatement order contained in the UOSH
citation requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame resistant
coveralls purportedly

required

under

29

CFR

1910.132(a) was

unenforceable and void as a matter of law and therefore granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Magcorp on that issue.
171, 173].

[R.

In addition, the ALJ found that disputed issues of

material facts existed in regard to the issue of whether Magcorp
4

was in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.132(a) and for that reason
denied summary judgment on that issue.

[R. 171, 174]. Based on

that ruling, Magcorp, on April 28, 1992, withdrew its objection to
the penalty assessed in conjunction with the Citation And Notice Of
Penalty and paid the amount UOSH had assessed.

[R. 314].

On July 16, 1992, some thirty-six days after the ALJ's order
was issued, UOSH filed its Motion For Review.

[R. 177, 178-182].

Magcorp then filed its Motion To Dismiss, asserting that UOSH's
Motion For Review was filed more than 30 days after the order
sought to be reviewed was issued and that the Industrial Commission
therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the Motion For Review.
[R. 208-209, 211-252].

On October 9, 1992, the Commission issued

its Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss, ruling that UOSH's
Motion For Review was timely filed based on the date indicated on
the mailing certificate purportedly attached to the ALJ's Order on
June 16, 1992, and directed Magcorp to respond to UOSH's Motion For
Review.

[R. 288-291].

The Commission issued its Order Granting

Motion For Review on December 17, 1992.

[R. 336-341].

Magcorp

filed its Petition For Writ Of Review on January 14, 1993.

[R.

344-45]. Magcorp filed its [First] Motion For Summary Disposition
and supporting memorandum on February 26, 1993.

[R. 471-472, 473-

501].
Magcorp informed the court of appeals that the June 10, 1992
Order signed by the ALJ had been improperly altered, and the
parties subsequently stipulated that the material error should be
5

corrected.

[R. 507-508, 509, 510-512, 515, 521].

On April 29,

1993, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Commission
to allow UOSH to bring a motion for extension of time under Utah
Code Ann.f § 63-46b-l (Supp. 1992).

[R. 519]. The Commission did

not rule on the UOSH Motion For Extension Of Time until October 20,
1993, when it issued its Order Granting Motion For Extension Of
Time.

[R. 533-538].

Magcorp filed its Second Motion For Summary Disposition and
supporting Memorandum on or about November 30, 1993. [R. 542-574].
By Order dated December 17, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals ordered
that Magcorp's first and second motions for summary disposition
were

denied

and

the

issues

raised

deferred

pending

plenary

presentation and consideration of the case.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1.

On August 17, 1991, subsequent to inspection number

105638639, the Utah

Occupational

Safety

and

Health

Division

("UOSH") issued a Citation And Notification Of Penalty to the
petitioner, Magnesium Corporation of America ("Magcorp"), alleging
Magcorp failed to provide the use of flame resistant protective
clothing in the electrolytic and reactor sections of Magcorp's
plant in violation of 29 CFR 1910.132(a) and alleging violations of
USGOR 500-405-558.2.7.[R. 001-002].
2.

That citation was withdrawn and a second Citation And

Notification Of Penalty was subsequently reissued to Magcorp on
September 3, 1991. [R. 001-003].
6

3.

As a result of the alleged violation, UOSH imposed a

$2,200,00 penalty, together with an abatement order requiring
Magcorp to provide flame resistant clothing to all applicable
employees at no cost or financial expense to the employees.

[R.

002].
4.

Magcorp contested the Citation And Notice Of Penalty and

filed its Motion For Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum and
affidavits on March 24, 1992. [R. 014-091].
5.

Magcorp7s Motion For Summary Judgment was heard by the

Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge for the
Industrial Commission of Utah ("ALJ"), on April 17, 1992. [R. 124,
383-450].
6.

At that hearing, counsel for both parties presented

evidence and oral argument regarding two issues: 1) Whether Magcorp
had violated 29 CFR 1910.132(a) by failing to provide flame
resistant personal protective clothing to certain Magcorp employees
engaging

in duties

in the

areas

known

as

the

reactor

and

electrolytic sections of Magcorp's plant, and 2) Whether UOSH
properly included in the Citation And Notification Of Penalty an
abatement note requiring Magcorp to bear the costs of flame
resistant personal protective clothing purportedly required under
29 CFR 1910.132(a) for its employees. [R. 394, 383-450].
7.

The ALJ considered, inter alia, the August 9, 1985

Memorandum of Byron R. Chadwick, Regional Administrator of the U.S.
Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
7

that set forth guidelines to be followed by OSHA agencies in
determining

the

allocation

of

cost

for

protective

equipment

required under 29 CFR 1910.132(a), [R. 90-91, 171, 315-316, 402403, 410], the decision in The Budd Co. v. OSHRC. 513 F.2d 807 (3rd
Cir.

1975),

2 OSCH

1698

(1975),

[R. 171, 173, 402-403],

and

documents and affidavits addressing Magcorp / s collective bargaining
with the United

Steelworkers of America regarding payment for

protective equipment. [R. 44-48, 358-381, 382, 389, 395, 417-419,
425-428].
8.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ ruled that the

abatement note contained in the UOSH Citation And Notification Of
Penalty requiring Magcorp to bear the costs of flame resistant
personal protective clothing purportedly required under 29 CFR
1910.132(a) was unenforceable and void as a matter of law and
therefore granted partial summary judgment in favor of Magcorp on
that issue. [R. 170-171, 173, 446-449].
9.
fact

The ALJ also determined that disputed issues of material

existed

in

regard

to

the

issue

whether

Magcorp

was

in

compliance with 29 CFR 1910.132(a) and for that reason denied
summary judgment on that issue. [R. 170-171, 174].
10.

Based on the ALJ's ruling, Magcorp, on April 28, 1992,

withdrew its objection to the Citation And Notice Of Penalty issued
in conjunction with the Citation and paid the $2,200.00 penalty
that UOSH had assessed.
11.

[R. 314].

That payment of penalty was based solely on the fact that
8

Magcorp did not require its employees to wear flame resistant
personal protective clothing and was not an admission that Magcorp
was required to provide the clothing at its own expense. [R.314].
12.

Copies of the proposed Order and proposed Findings And

Conclusions were provided to UOSH / s counsel on approximately April
28, 1992, and May 27, 1992.
13.
form."

[R. 168, 172, 222].

UOSH's counsel signed both documents "approved as to
[R. 168, 172, 174, 222].

14.

The Order, [R.173-174], and the Findings Of Fact And

Conclusions

Of

Law

("Findings

and

Conclusions")

[R.169-172],

regarding the Motion For Summary Judgment were signed by the ALJ on
June 10, 1992 in the presence of counsel for both parties. [R. 222,
223, 225, 269].
15.

The Order and the Findings And Conclusions were passed by

the Industrial Commission Of Utah ("Commission") on that same date.
[R. 171, 174].
16.

June

A.

Stoddard,

a

paralegal

in

the

Industrial

Commission Adjudication Division, filed the order on June 10, 1992.
[R. 226].
17.

Ms. Stoddard hand-delivered a certified copy to counsel

for Magcorp and then placed a second certified copy in a box to be
forwarded to counsel for UOSH. [R. 222, 225-226, 264].
18.

On

June

10, 1992, Magcorp's

counsel

offered

UOSH's

counsel a photocopy of the certified copy of the Order. [R. 222225].
9

19.

UOSH's counsel declined the offer and stated he had

retained a copy of the Order that he had previously executed
"approved as to form." [R. 168, 272].
20.

On or about June 16, 1992, a certificate of mailing that

was signed by Pilar Gorlinski, another Adjudication

Division

employee, for June A. Stoddard was attached to the Order. [R. 175,
264].
21.

Neither of the parties nor their counsel received a copy

of the Order as a result of the Order purportedly being mailed as
was averred in the mailing certificate, and there is no credible
evidence that the Order was properly mailed to the parties or their
counsel on June 16, 1992. [R. 223, 226, 269].
22.

On July 16, 1992, some 36 days after the ALJ's Order was

issued, UOSH filed its Motion For Review, along with a supporting
memorandum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.f

§ 63-46b-12

(1988),

requesting that the Order entered by the ALJ be reversed and that
the cause be remanded for a hearing on the merits. [R. 176-201].
23.

In initial response to UOSH's Motion For Review, Magcorp

filed its Motion To Dismiss, along with a supporting memorandum, on
or about August 11, 1992, asserting that UOSH's Motion For Review
was filed more than 30 days after the issuance of the Order UOSH
sought to be reviewed. [R. 208-252].
24.

The Commission, on October 9, 1992, issued its Interim

Order Denying Motion To Dismiss, ruling that UOSH/s Motion For
Review was timely filed based on the date indicated on the June 16,
10

1992 mailing certificate purportedly attached to the ALJ's Order
six days after its issuance and directed Magcorp to respond to
UOSH's Motion For Review. [R. 175, 288-91, 507-508, 509, 510-512,
513, 515].
25.

After the parties submitted memoranda addressing UOSH's

Motion For Review, the Commission issued its Order Granting Motion
For Review on December 17, 1992. [R. 177, 178-182, 293-316, 336341].
26.

The Commission's Order Granting Motion For Review was

necessarily based on its earlier determination, as stated in the
Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss, that it had jurisdiction
to review the Order and the Findings And Conclusions previously
entered by the ALJ. [R. 288-291, 336-341].
27.

Magcorp filed its Petition For Writ Of Review on January

14, 1993, and its Docketing Statement on February 18, 1993. [R.
344-345, 451-470].
28.

Magcorp filed its [First] Motion For Summary Disposition

and supporting memorandum on February 26, 1993. [R. 471-501].
29.

On or about April 7, 1993, Magcorp filed its Motion To

Correct Record which was supported by the Stipulation of the
parties in which the parties agreed that a date on the June 10,
1992 Order signed by the ALJ had been altere
Record

should

^

corrected

to

indicate

that page 174 of the
that

the

Industrial

Commission's stamp appearing on that page should be dated the 10th
day of June instead of the 16th and that the Order was "passed" by
11

the Commission on that date. [R. 507-508, 509, 510-512, 513-515,
521].
30.

The counsel ordered the Industrial Commission to make the

stipulated corrections to the record.
31.

[R. 521, 606-607].

On April 29, 1993 the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the

case to the Commission

"for the limited purpose of allowing

respondent to bring a motion for an extension under Utah Code Ann. ,
§ 63-46b-l (Supp. 1992).

The Commission shall forward a copy of

its order on the Motion to this court promptly." [R. 519].
32.

The parties filed their respective memoranda addressing

UOSH's Motion For Extension Of Time, and the Commission did not
rule on the Motion For Extension Of Time until October 20, 1993,
when it issued its Order Granting Motion For Extension of Time. [R.
522-523, 526-532, 533-538].
33.

Magcorp,s Second Motion For Summary Disposition was filed

on November 30, 1993.
34.

[R. 542-543, 544-576].

By Order dated December 17, 1993, the Utah Court of

Appeals denied the motions for summary disposition Magcorp had
filed and deferred ruling on the issues raised therein pending
plenary presentation and arbitration of the case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION LACKED JURISDICTION
TO CONSIDER UOSH#S MOTION FOR REVIEW BECAUSE
THE MOTION WAS FILED MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFTER
THE ISSURANCE OF THE UNDERLYING ORDER.

The constellation of arguments subsumed under Magcorp's Point
12

I establish that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider
UOSH's Motion For Review because the motion was filed more than 30
days after the issuance of the underlying Order made by the ALJ and
issued by the Commission on June 16, 1992. Those issues were, in
large

part, raised

in Magcorp's

[First] Motion

For

Summary

Disposition and Second Motion For Summary Disposition, and those
issues

have

been

deferred

pending

plenary

presentation

and

consideration of this case. The Commission's Order Granting Motion
For Extension Of Time entered after remand also suffers from the
jurisdictional infirmity. That order was an improper nunc pro tunc
order, and the Court of Appeal's remand did not revive the
jurisdiciton the Commission had lost. The Commission further erred
when it determined that an extension of time was not necessary,
that § 63-46b-l(9) allowed for an extension of time in which UOSH
could file its motion for review, that UOSH established good cause
for the extension and that excusble neglect was not the applicable
standard to be applied, and in failing to give Dusty's v. Utah
State Tax Commission retrospective application. All of the actions
of the Commission, including those on remand, are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.

The ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order should be

recognized as and remain the final judgment in this case.
II.

THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
IT REVERSED THE ALJ#S ORDER AND ENTERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MAGCORP.

In its Order Granting Motion For Review, the Commission
concluded that disputed issues of material facts existed but then
13

went on to reverse the ALJ's Order and enter summary judgment
against Magcorp dispite those disputed issues of fact. That action
was clearly violative of Utah Rule of civil Procedure, 56(c) and
was arbitrary and capricious.

If this court determines the

Commission had jurisdiction to enter the Order Granting Motion For
Review and accepts the Commission's conclusion that genuine issues
of material facts exist, Magcorp requests that it be allowed a full
hearing

before

the ALJ

on

the

merits

of

the

Citation

And

Notification Of Penalty.
III. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
IT ORDERED MAGCORP TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR
LAUNDRY SERVICES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES FOR
PROTECTIVE COVERALLS EXPOSED TO FIBERFRAX
WITHOUT FIRST AFFORDING MAGCORP NOTICE AND A
HEARING ON THE ISSUE.
The Commission entertained issues that were not raised in the
Citation And Notification Of Penalty that initiated this action and
ordered Magcorp to provide and pay for laundry services for the
protective coveralls.
proper notice.

That action denied Magcorp due process and

This court should reverse the laundry services

portion of the order of the Order Granting Motion For Review.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION LACKED JURISDICTION
TO CONSIDER UOSH'S MOTION FOR REVIEW BECAUSE
THE MOTION WAS FILED MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFTER
THE ISSUANCE OF THE UNDERLYING ORDER.

Magcorp7s [First] Motion For Summary Disposition and Second
Motion For Summary Disposition and supporting memoranda [R. 471501, 542-574] were denied and the issues presented therein deferred
14

pending plenary presentation and consideration of the case by order
of the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1993. Magcorp submits
that the Industrial Commission of Utah

("Commission") lacked

jurisdiction, both initially and on remand, to consider UOSH's
Motion For Review and UOSH's Motion For Extension Of Time.
A.

UOSH#s Motion For Review was filed more than
30 days after the Industrial Commission
"issued" the Order.

The Order and the Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
("Findings And Conclusions") were signed by the ALJ and also issued
by the Commission on June 10, 1992.

Utah Code Ann. , § 63-46b-

12(1)(a) (1988), states:
If a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek
review of the order by the agency or by a
superior agency, the aggrieved party may file
a written request for review within 30 days
after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purpose
by statute or rule.
The 30 day time limit for filing a motion for review is mandatory
and

is the

jurisdictional

linchpin upon which the reviewing

tribunal's jurisdiction depends.

See Bonded Bicycle v. Dept. of

Employment Security. 844 P. 2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1992) (per
curiam); Silva v. Dept. of Employment Security. 786 P.2d 246, 247
(Utah App. 1990) (per curiam); Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d
569, 571 (Utah App. 1989); Retherford v. Industrial Commission. 739
P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1987); Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Co.. 767 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984).
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UOSH's Motion For Review was

not filed until July 16, 1992, six days after the termination of
the 30 day time limit for filing a motion for review.

[R. 177].

The Commission did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion and
should have dismissed it as a matter of law.

In considering the

Motion

acted

For

Review, the

Commission

clearly

beyond

the

jurisdiction conferred upon it, erroneously interpreted and applied
the law, engaged in an unlawful procedure and acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, substantially prejudicing Magcorp.

See Utah Code

Ann.f § 63-46b-16(4) (1988).
Subsection (l)(a) of § 63-46b-12 has not been amended since
April 25, 1988, and the date of an order's issuance has always
been synonymous with the date the order bears on its face.
Support for that conclusion is found in the
U.A.P.A. itself.
Section 63-46b-21 governs
agency action of declaratory orders. After
receiving petitions for declaratory orders,
agencies may issue written orders. Copies of
all orders issued in response to requests for
declaratory
proceedings must
be
mailed
promptly
to petitioners or other parties.
Inasmuch as declaratory orders have the same
status and binding effect as any other orders
issued
in an adjudicative proceeding, it
follows that the differentiation between
issuance
and mailing
may not be limited to
declaratory orders alone, (footnote omitted).
Dusty#s v. Utah State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992)
(per curiam).

The Utah Court of Appeals is "bound to follow the

1

A previous version, Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-12(l) (1987),
provided for only "10 days" as the time in which the aggrieved
party could file a written request for review. See Hi-Country
Homeowners v. PSC of Utah, 779 P2d 682, 683 (Utah 1989).
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rule of law as it has been pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court."
Bonded Bicycle, 844 P.2d at 360.
It is undisputed that UOSH did not file its Motion For Review
until July 16, 1992, some 36 days after the Order was issued. The
30 day period for filing the Motion For Review was not extended by
a Commission decision rendered after the filing of a proper and
timely motion for extension of time.

Furthermore, UOSH cannot

claim justifiable reliance on Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d
1199 (Utah App. 1992), under the peculiar facts of this case as
they repeatedly have done in responding to this issue.

UOSH's

primary argument was that it could rely on the June 16, 1992
mailing date stated on the mailing certificate purportedly attached
to the order nearly a week after it was issued.

[R. 175]. That

argument is not only contrary to law, but in addition the mailing
certificate provides no evidence of an actual or proper mailing
because it did not result in actual receipt by any of the parties.
[T. 223, 226, 269].

The June 16, 1992 date is not "accurately

evidenced" by the mailing certificate. Wiggins P 824 P.2d at 1199.
Notably, the Order appearing in the record of the proceedings is a
?

.

.

.

photocopy [R. 173-174]c and no similar mailing certificate was
attached to the Findings And Conclusions. [R. 169-172].
Copies of the proposed Order and proposed Findings And
?
.
.
.
c
The pr
ous page 174 of the record, which existed prior to
the record being corrected [see e.g., R. 313], was also a
photocopy. The original page of the document represented at page
174 of the record has never been part of the record of proceedings.
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Conclusions were provided to UOSH's counsel on approximately April
28, 1992 and May 27, 1992.

[R. 168, 172, 222]. Counsel for both

parties were present when the ALJ signed the Order and the Findings
And Conclusions, and UOSH/s counsel had actual notice that the
order was signed on June 10, 1992.

[R. 222, 223, 225, 269].

UOSH's counsel had signed both documents "approved as to form".
[R. 168, 174, 222]. On June 10, 1992, June Stoddard, a paralegal
in the Commission's Adjudication Division, placed a copy of the
Order in a box in her work area from which it was to be taken by
another Adjudication Division employee and forwarded to UOSH's
counsel.

[R. 225-226, 264]. UOSH's counsel had actual notice that

Magcorp's counsel received a certified copy of the Order, and
Magcorp's counsel then personally offered to provide UOSH's counsel
with a copy.

[R. 222-225]. UOSH's counsel declined that offer and

stated he had retained a copy of the Order that he previously
executed "approved as to form."

[R. 168, 222]. Most important, he

declined personal service of a copy that same day when one was
offered to him by Magcorp's counsel and stated he would rely on the
copy he already had.

[R. 168, 227].

In addition, UOSH was

undoubtedly aware that the Order should have been entered no later
than 30 days after the April 17, 1992 hearing.

Utah Code Ann. §

35-9-12(3)(b) (1989).
On approximately June 16 or 17, 1992, UOSH's counsel informed
June Stoddard that he had not received an executed copy of that
order. [R. 226]. Ms. Stoddard indicated he should have received
18

one because she placed it in the box for mailing on June 10, 1992.
[R. 226]. On or about approximately June 23 through June 26, 1992,
UOSH's counsel again inquired of Ms. Stoddard why he had not
received a ccoy of the order. [R. 226]. At that time, Ms. Stoddard
personally went to the file cabinet which contained the file,
pulled the Order, made a copy and hand-delivered the Order to
UOSH's counsel.

[R. 223].

Neither of the parties7 counsel

received a copy of the Order in the mail or by other mode of
delivery as a result of the Order allegedly being mailed as was
averred in the mailing certificate dated June 16, 1992.
223, 226, 269].

[R. 175,

UOSH's counsel was unequivocally aware of the

contents of the Order and the Findings and Conclusions and that
they had both been signed by ALJ on June 10, 1992. He further had
easy access to the Adjudication Division's file to check the date
the Order was "passed" by the Commission.
UOSH's

attempt

to

rely

on

the

certificate is questionable at best.

June

16,

1992

mailing

The fact that the alleged

June 16, 1992 mailing date coincides with the as of yet unexplained
alteration

of

the

date

hand-written

onto

the

Industrial

Commission's stamp that appeared on the second page of the Order
before

the

record

was

corrected

calls

UOSH's

reliance

question. [R. 174, 507-508, 509, 510-512, 513-515, 521].

into
It is

uncontroverted, however, that UOSH's counsel had a copy of and
actual notice of the signing of the Order.

"It would be improper

to find that sloppy office procedures in some way expanded
19

jurisdiction beyond that conferred by the legislature.

Subject

matter jurisdiction cannot by expanded by waiver or consent."
Varian-Eimac, 767 P. 2d at 571 and n.3; Cf. 10/9/92 Interim Order
Denying

Motion

To

Dismiss

at

2.

[R.

289].

That

rule

is

particularly applicable in cases such as this where UOSH is a
division of the Commission, the Commission was the reviewing
tribunal and the Commissions counsel has appeared to argue the
case on the merits.

See Memorandum In Opposition To Petitioner's

Motion For Summary Disposition [R. 584-593]; Notice Of Correction
Of Record [R. 605-607]; and see Notice Of Appearance Of Counsel in
the Utah Court of Appeals dated September 23, 1993.
Because UOSH's Motion For Review was not timely filed, the
Commission, inter alia, acted without jurisdiction by proceeding
and entering adjudication on the merits of the case, Benchmark v.
Salt Lake Valley Mental Health Board, Inc. . 830 P.2d 218, 219 (Utah
1991); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987),
and substantially prejudiced Magcorp by denying it the benefit of
the ALJ's ruling and also its right to proceed to a full hearing on
the merits of the case.

Both the Interim Order Denying Motion To

Dismiss and the Order Granting Motion For Review were entered
absent jurisdiction and are therefore null and void. Thompson. 943
P.2d at 1232.

As a result, the ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order must

remain the final agency order in this action.

20

B.

The Commission#s Order Granting Motion For
Extension Of Time entered after remand was
entered absent jurisdiction and is erroneous
as a matter of law.
1.)

The Commission's Order Granting
Motion For Extension Of Time is an
improper nunc pro tunc order.

Despite UOSH's awareness of Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-l(9)
(Supp. 1992), at the time Magcorp filed its Motion To Dismiss, it
failed to make a formal motion for an extension in time in which to
file its Motion For Review.

[R. 257, 533]. Because UOSH did not

properly raise or preserve its request for an extension of time, it
should not have been allowed to advance that request on appeal.
This court nonetheless remanded the case to the Commission "for the
limited purpose of allowing respondent to bring a motion for an
extension of time under Utah Code Ann.r § 63-46b-l (Supp. 1992)."
The resulting Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time is an
improper nunc pro tunc order.
A nunc pro tunc order may be properly entered only "for the
purpose of making the record reflect what actually was meant to
happen at a prior time."

Baashaw v. Bacrshaw. 788 P.2d 1057, 1061

(Utah App. 1990) .
In Bagshaw,
this
court
explained
principles of nunc pro tunc.
At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed
a court to correct its earlier error
or supply its omission so that the
record accurately reflected that
which in fact had taken place.
Cases in which courts traditionally
have applied the nunc pro tunc
doctrine fall into two categories:

the

(1)
Those in which one of the
parties died after the submission of
the case to the lower court for its
decision, but before the actual
rendition of judgment; and
(2) Those in which a judgment has in
fact been rendered by the lower
court, but the clerk has failed to
perform the ministerial function of
entry.
Bagshaw, 788 P. 2d at 1060 (quoting 6A James W.
Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice § 58.08
(1989)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
Thus, nunc pro tunc orders are
used to correct the court's omission or error.
Further, any issue addressed in the order must
have been previously submitted to the court.
Moreover, nunc pro tunc orders cannot be used
,f,
to revive the time for taking the required
step in a legal proceeding after the statutory
time for doing so [has] elapsed.,fl
Diehl
Lumber Transp.,
Inc. v. Mickelson,
802 P. 2 d
739, 743 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Kettner
v.
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah
1962)).
Southwick v. Leone, 860 P. 2d 973, 977-78 (Utah App. 1993).
also Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984).

See

"The court

cannot enter a nunc pro tunc order based on what it might or should
have done had there been a motion or hearing...[;it cannot]
bootstrap its authority to act simply by issuing a nunc pro tunc
order relating back..." Southwick, 860 P.2d at 978. UOSH did not
file a motion for extension of time prior to filing its Motion For
Review with the Commission, and the Commission did not address the
issue at the time. This court's remand Order did not change those
facts and could not, by way of an anomalous procedural device,
endow the Commission with the jurisdiction it otherwise did not
have to consider the untimely Motion For Review or the clearly
22

unmeritorious Motion For Extension Of Time.

UOSH should not have

been allowed to resurrect a right forfeited by passage of time.
The October 20, 1993 Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time is
therefore invalid.
2.)

An extension of time was necessary.

The Commission's Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time
concludes "no extension of time was necessary."

[R. 534-535].

That conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law. Even assuming the
30 day period for filing the Motion For Review could have been
extended after the fact, extension could only be accomplished by
the timely filing of a motion for extension of time. The fact that
the Court of Appeals directed the Commission to address the issue
establishes a motion was necessary in this case, although Magcorp
disagrees with the procedural propriety of the remand.

The

Commission's conclusion to the contrary was based on an erroneous
interpretation

and application

of the law, was an abuse of

discretion and was arbitrary and capricious.
3.)

Section
63-46b-l(9)
does
not
expressly authorize an extension of
time for filing a motion for review.

Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-12(l)(a)

(1988), provides "the

aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 30
days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity
designated for that purpose by the statute or rule."

Following

UOSH's suggestion, the Commission concluded that Utah Code Ann., §
63-46b-l(9), allows the Commission to grant an extension of time
3

for filing a motion for review even after the 30 day period has
elapsed.

[R. 534],

The Commission relied on Maverick Country

Stores v. Industrial Commission, 214 U.A.R. 34, 37,
(Utah App. 1993),

to support its conclusion.

P.2d

Maverick, however,

did not specifically address the issue of whether § 63-46b-l(9)
could be invoked after the statutory time period has elapsed to
extend the time for filing a motion for review for good cause
shown. UOSH's Motion For Extension Of Time was not filed until May
28, 1993, nearly eleven months after the fact.

[R. 522]. Because

the petitioner in Maverick filed a request for reconsideration, in
which it made no attempt to show good cause, instead of a motion
for extension of time, Maverick cannot be fairly stretched to
support the propositions that a motion for extension of time can be
filed after

the 30 day time limit or that good cause

is sufficient

to support a motion for extension made after the expiration of the
specified period.
Administrative agencies have no more power than that which is
expressly or impliedly granted by statute. Nielsen v. Division of
P.O.S.T., 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah App. 1993); Olympus Oil, Inc..
v. Harrison, 778 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah App. 1989).

See also

Williams v. Public Service Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988)
(any reasonable doubt of the existence of agency power must be
^ That opinion was amended on September 7, 1993, prior to the
issuance of the Commission's Order Granting Motion For Extension Of
Time. Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d
944 (Utah App. 1993) .
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resolved against the existence of such power); Bevans v. Industrial
Commission. 790 P. 2d 573, 578 (Utah App. 1990) ("The Industrial
Commission

is

not

free

to

'legislate'

in

areas

apparently

overlooked by our lawmakers or to exercise power not expressly or
impliedly granted to it by the legislature, even in the name of
fairness."). The Commission failed to harmonize § 63-46b-12(l)(a)
(1988) with § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1992).

If this court were to

approve that approach, the result would be chaotic administrative
and judicial appellate procedure.

See e.g., Silva v. Dept. of

Employment Security, 786 P.2d at 247; Isaacson v. Dorius. 669 P.2d
849, 851 (Utah 1983).

The 30 day jurisdictional bar proscribed by

§ 63-46b-12(l)(a) is rendered illusory if the Commission at any
later date and based merely on good cause may extend that 30 day
time period.

Nothing would prevent the Commission from granting

its own Occupational Health and Safety Division's motion for an
extension of time made months or even years after the statutory
period had run, and the certainty that normally attaches to
administrative decisions would be lost.

See Silva, 786 P. 2d at

247. The Commission adopted a notion that defies both common sense
and

jurisprudential

reason;

that

§

63-46b-l(9)

affords

the

Commission unlimited power to lengthen any time period if presented
with a motion filed at any time after the proceedings are otherwise
final. In adhering to that notion, the Commission acted beyond its
* Cf. Utah R. App. P. 4(e); and see Prowswood, Inc., v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 767 P.2d 952, 959-61 (Utah App. 1987).
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jurisdiction, misinterpreted and misapplied the law, abused its
discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
4.)

UOSH did not establish good cause or
excusable neglect for an extension
of time.

In response to UOSH's belated Motion For Extension Of Time,
Magcorp argued that Rules 6(b) and 81(d), U.R.C.P., required UOSH
to show excusable neglect before an extension of time could be
granted.

The Commission concluded that the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure did not apply and that a showing of excusable neglect was
not required.

[R. 535, 537]. The Commission failed to analyze the

applicability of Rule 6(b), but instead reached its conclusion by
setting up straw men in the form of Rule 6(e) and 81(a), and
knocking them down with Maverick (214 U.A.R. 34) and Griffith v.
Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204 (1965).

The

application of the individual subdivisions of each rule must be
analyzed separately.
Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., states:
When by these rules or by a notice given
thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may
at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefore is made before
the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration
of the specified period permit the act to be
done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend
the time for taking any action under rules
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and
26

73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under
the conditions stated in them.
(emphasis
added).
The Commission misinterpreted the remand to be for the purpose of
"a determination whether UOSH showed good cause for an extension of
time to file its motion for review...."

[R. 533]. However, the

Court of Appeals did not expressly or implicitly state that good
cause was the applicable standard.

"On remand the trial court has

only such jurisdiction with respect to an issue appealed as is
conferred by the opinion and mandate of the appellate court." Amax
Magnesium v. Utah State Tax Commission, 848 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah
App. 1993) (quoting Normand in re Normand v. Ray, 785 P.2d 743,
748-49 (N.M. 1990)). And, of course, the jurisdiction of the lower
tribunal on remand doesn't exist at all if the appellate court has
no jurisdiction to remand the question.

Rule 6(b) U.R.C.P.,

requiring excusable neglect, is made applicable to this proceeding
by Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P. which states:
These rules shall apply to the practice and
procedure in appealing from or obtaining a
review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in
connection with any such appeal or review is
in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
See, e.g., Utah Chiropractic Ass/n v. Equitable Lifef 579 P.2d
1327, 1329 (Utah 1978).

Applying Rule 6(b) to these proceedings

does not conflict or operate inconsistently with the provisions of
the Utah Administrative

Procedures Act.

Rule

6(b) actually

supplies needed certainty with respect to the time for review. See
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Silva. 786 P.2d at 247. If this court determines that a motion to
enlarge time made after the expiration of the time period is
permissible, it logically follows that the motion must be made in
accord with rule 6(b) and that excusable neglect must be shown.
Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah
1983) (addressing only rule 41(a)(1)), relied on by the Commission,
was not intended to be and should not be blindly followed as a
comprehensive discourse on the applicability of individual rules of
civil procedure in administrative proceedings. Section 63-46b-l(9)
provides only that "Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer,....11

It is not a specific grant of

authority to do anything, and it does not render rule 6(b) clearly
inapplicable.

Section 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1992), also fails to

support the Commission's conclusion because it provides only that
the

Utah

Administrative

Procedures

Act

applies

to

these

proceedings. It does not direct that the individual Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure do not apply.
The facts detailed in point I.A., above, establish that UOSH
did not demonstrate either good cause or excusable neglect for its
failure to file the Motion For Review in time. "When the question
of 'excusable neglect' arises in a jurisdictional context, as
opposed to a nonjurisdictional context, the standard contemplated
thereby is a necessarily strict one." Prowswood, 676 P.2d at 959
(citations omitted).
Inadvertence or mistake of counsel does not
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constitute the type of unique or extraordinary
circumstances contemplated by this strict
standard.
The application of this rule is well
illustrated in the following cases. In Feltch
v. General Rental Co., appellants sought to
excuse the untimely filing of their notice of
appeal on the basis of a mistake they had made
in interpreting a rule of appellate procedure.
In rejecting this excuse, the court noted the
strict construction given the "excusable
neglect" concept in federal forums, supra, and
held: "A flat mistake of counsel about the
meaning of a statute or rule may not justify

relief: relief
is not extended "to cover any
kind of garden variety oversight."
(footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added by underlining).
Prowswood/ 676 P.2d at 960.

UOSH's counsel indicated he had

retained a copy of the Order that he had executed "approved as to
form" prior to the ALJ signing it on June 10, 1992, in counsels'
presence [R. 168, 172, 174, 222]. UOSH's failure to act upon the
knowledge he had at that time does not meet the excusable neglect
standard.

See Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah,

733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987); Utah Code Ann. . § 35-9-12(3) (c)
(1989).

Even the failure to receive a copy of the order from the

Commission because it was not mailed does not constitute excusable
neglect.

See In Re: Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462,

467 (Utah 1952).
The thirty-day time period to file an appeal
may not be extended because the agency's
decision was mailed to petitioner or was not
received by petitioner until days after its
service.
To allow time for appeal to be
extended because of receipt in the mail is
contrary to the statutory language and would
render uncertain a time for appeal in
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virtually every case.
The appeal time
commences when the final agency order issues
and not when allegedly received by a party.
Nor can the thirty-day time period be extended
because the agency mailed a copy to the
petitioner.
Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. "[I]f during [the] period he is aware or
should be aware of a reason for delay, then to ignore the time
period and later claim excusable neglect, without filing for an
extension

of

time,

is, in our opinion,

no

foundation

for

objection." Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126,
388 P.2d 798, 801 (1964). There is no legal or factual support for
the Commission's post-eleventh hour grant of extended time for UOSH
to file its Motion For Review, that in actual effect unlawfully
revived the Commission's jurisdiction over this case.
5.) Dusty#s v, Utah State Tax Commission
applies retrospectively.
In

what

retrospective

was

apparently

application

a

convenient

sidestep

of the

of Dusty's, the Commission's

Order

Granting Motion For Extension Of Time contains at least four
references to the concept of "the law in effect at the time," that
law being Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah App.
1992), to support the conclusion that UOSH showed good cause for an
extension of time to file the Motion For Review.

The Commission

cited to neither a case law nor other authority to support its "law
in effect at the time" concept. Clearly, the "law in effect at the
time" was no different than the law as it exists today.

Dusty's,

842 P.2d at 870 ("...argument that the date of issue is ambiguous
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and

subject

to

several

inconsistent

interpretations

is

not

persuasive.11)
"In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision
is effective

both

prospectively

and

decision which overrules prior law."

retrospectively,

even a

Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839

P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992) (footnote omitted).
This court has developed a sound theoretical
framework for determining when a new rule of
law in a civil case will be applied
retroactively.
In Van Dyke v. Chappel, we
noted
that
retroactive
or
prospective
operation is not a question of judicial power
but instead depends "solely upon an appraisal
of the relevant judicial policies to be
advanced."
We stated that in making the
determination,
we look to the impact retroactive
application would have on those affected.
When we conclude that there has been
justifiable reliance on the prior state
of the law or that the retroactive
application of the new law may otherwise
create an undue burden, the court may
order that a decision apply only
prospectively. (footnotes omitted).
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission. 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah
1993).

As is demonstrated above in point I.A. and I.B.5., UOSH

cannot claim justifiable reliance on any contrary prior law under
the facts of this case to escape retrospective application of
Dusty's.
In addition, retrospective application of Dusty's cannot pose
an undue burden upon UOSH where it had actual notice of and
possession of t^e ALJ's order.

See Dusty#s. 842 P.2d at 870. No

small

should

measure

of

suspicion

accompany

this

court's

examination of the suggestion that the alleged June 16, 1992
mailing certificate date is the "issue" date when that date
coincides only with what the parties have agreed is an improperly
altered date hand-written upon the Commission's stamp appearing on
the second page of the June 10, 1992 Order.

[R. 510-512].

Furthermore, even under Wigginsf "issuance" includes the date
the agency order is "personally served".
1199.

Wiggins, 824 P.2d at

For all purposes and effect, UOSH's counsel was served on

June 10, 1992.

UOSH's counsel declined personal service of a

certified copy on June 10, 1992, when one was offered to him by
Magcorp's counsel and he stated he would rely on the copy he
already had.

[R. 222]. Therefore, personal service upon UOSH was

plainly completed

on June 10, 1992, pursuant to Rule 4(j),

U.R.C.P.f which provides "If the person to be served refuses to
accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the
person serving the same shall state the name of the process and
offer to deliver a copy thereof." In addition, a copy of the Order
was dedicated to him and placed by an Adjudication Division
paralegal in a box to be forwarded to him. [R. 226]. In light of
those facts, it is wholly unreasonable that UOSH would be permitted
to manipulate and extend the commencement of the time within which
a motion for review could be filed simply by declining to accept
service of a copy of the Order.
Dusty's v. Utah State Tax Commission has not been limited to
only prospective application, see Maverick, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App.
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1993); Bonded Bicycle v. Dept. of Employment Security, 844 P.2d 358
(Utah App. 1992) (per curiam), and the Commission's Order Granting
Motion For Extension Of Time was entered without jurisdiction and
is erroneous as a matter of law.
Magcorp

submits

that

its

[First]

Motion

For

Summary

Disposition and Second Motion For Summary Disposition call for the
correct

resolution

of

this

case.

The

Commission

lacked

jurisdiction to consider UOSH's Motion For Review because the
motion was filed more than 30 days after the issuance of the
underlying order.

The case became final and unreviewable and

unappealable some six days prior to the filing of the Motion For
Review.

As a result, all subsequent proceedings, including those

before this court and before the Commission on remand, are null and
void.

The ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order should be recognized as and

remain the final judgment in this case.
The imbricate subarguments presented above establish that the
Commission acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it by
statute and also violated Utah Code Ann.r § 63-46b-16(4)(d) and
(e), and (h)(i) and (iv) when it considered and reled on UOSH's
Motion For Review and again when it issued the belated Order
Granting Motion For Extension Of Time.
suffered as a result is manifest.

The prejudice Magcorp has

Magcorp was deprived of the

summary judgment ruling granted by the ALJ and wad denied the
finality that order acquired after the statutory thirty days had
elapsed. Magcorp requests this court to reverse the Commission and
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to reinstate the Order and Findings And Conclusions entered by the
ALJ on June 10, 1992.
II.

THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
IT REVERSED THE ALJ'S ORDER AND ENTERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MAGCORP.

The effect of the Order Granting Motion For Review issued by
the Commission was to reverse the ALJ's decision and to enter
summary judgment against Magcorp.

The Commission addressed the

question of whether the flame resistant coveralls required by UOSH
were "uniquely personal" to the wearer and determined that they
were not. [R. 338-340]. It arrived at that conclusion without the
benefit of the actual hands-on examination of the coveralls that
the ALJ performed.

[R. 441-445].

The Commission then determined

that the cost of the coveralls should be properly born by Magcorp.
[R. 339-340].
The inescapable truth is that the Commission determined that
there were disputed issues of fact that prevented the ALJ from
entering summary judgment in this case:
In the present case, the ALJ held a hearing on
Magcorp's motion for summary judgment, heard
argument and examined the coveralls at issue.
The ALJ then found that the coveralls were
uniquely personal protective equipment and
concluded as a matter of law that the cost of
the coveralls could be placed on the employees
under the reasoning in Budd. The ALJ then
issued findings of fact, conclusions of law
and an order granting Magcorp's motion for
summary judgment.
We don't believe that the order in this case
should properly be classified as one of
summary judgment because there were disputed
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questions of fact argued before the judge,
(emphasis added).
Order Granting Motion For Review at 4.

[R. 0339].

What the

Commission failed to explain was what authority enabled it, after
less deliberation than the ALJ engaged in, to summarily rule
against Magcorp.
If indeed disputed issues of material facts existed, it was
clearly improper for the Commission to reverse the ALJ's Order and
enter summary judgment against Magcorp when disputed issues of
material facts were recognized by the Commission.

Utah Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in pertinent part:
The
judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(emphasis added).
The Commission also erred because it is clear from the
Findings And Conclusions and the Order entered by the ALJ that the
only issues of disputed fact that existed related only to the
question of whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132(a), by not
requiring the use of flame resistant protective clothing in the
electrolytic and reactor sections of the facility.
174].

[R. 170-171,

The ALJ properly denied summary judgment on that issue as

requested by UOSH.

[R. 171, 174]. Based on that ruling, Magcorp,

on April 28, 1992, withdrew its objection to the notice of penalty
issued in conjunction with the citation and paid the $2,200.00
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penalty that UOSH had assessed.

[R. 314]. This payment of penalty

was based solely on the fact that Magcorp did not require its
employees to wear flame resistant personal protective clothing and
was not an admission that Magcorp was required to provide the
clothing at its expense. [R. 314]. As a practical matter, the cost
of defending the allegation far exceeded the financial penalty.
The ALJ's decision was legally sound and supported by The Budd Co.
V. OSHRC. 513 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1975), 2 OSCH 1698 (1975).
The Order Granting Motion For Review is confusing and does not
strictly comply with Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-12(6)(c) (1988). "An
administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of
law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful
appellate review."

Adams v. Board of Reviewr 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah

App. 1991); see also La Sal Oil v. Dept. of Environmental Quality,
843 P.2d 1047-48 (Utah App. 1992).
It is also essential that the Commission make
subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that
the critical subordinate factual issues are
highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as
to demonstrate that there is a logical and
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The
importance
of
complete,
accurate,
and
consistent findings of fact is essential to a
proper determination by an administrative
agency.
To that end, findings should be
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
reached. See generally,
P.2d
1336,
1338 (Utah

Rucker
1979).

v. Dal ton,
598
Without such

findings, this Court cannot perform its duty
of reviewing the Commission's order in
accordance with established legal principles
and of protecting the parties and public from
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arbitrary
action.

and

capricious

administrative

Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378
(Utah 1986); see also Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Division of
Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah App. 1990) (noting "the
importance of adequate findings supporting agency decisions"). The
proper remedy, assuming arguendo that this court has jurisdiction,
is remand.

But because the Commission has already concluded that

genuine issues of material facts exist, this court should remand
the case to the Commission with specific direction that they return
the case to the ALJ for a full hearing addressing the merits of the
Citation And Notification Of Penalty.

No purpose would be served

by a remand to the Commission to formulate more adequate findings
in support of, and to more fully articulate the reasons for their
decision.
The most glaring error is the fact that the Commission went
beyond UOSH,s prayer for relief that requested the ALJ's decision
be reversed and the case remanded for a full hearing on the merits.
[R. 182]. At most, the Commission had authority to remand the case
back to the ALJ for a full hearing on the merits as UOSH requested.
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(vi) (1988).

There is no legal

authority to support the Commissions action in first finding
disputed issues of material facts and then summarily reversing the
ALJ's Order in entering judgment against Magcorp.
The Commission's actions with respect to its reversal of the
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ALJ's partial summary judgment order and entry of summary judgment
against

Magcorp

manifestly

arbitrary

and

capricious.

The

Commission acted beyond its authority, engaged in an unlawful
decision making process, based

its decision on

facts either

disputed or not supported by substantial evidence, and clearly
abused its discretion.

If this court accepts the Commission's

conclusion that genuine issues of material facts exist, Magcorp
requests that it be allowed a full hearing on the merits of the
Citation And Notifiction Of Penalty before the ALJ.
III. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
IT ORDERED MAGCORP TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR
LAUNDRY SERVICES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES FOR
PROTECTIVE COVERALLS EXPOSED TO FIBERFRAX
WITHOUT FIRST AFFORDING MAGCORP NOTICE AND A
HEARING ON THE ISSUE.
Magcorp was denied due process and proper notice when the
Commission considered the issue of who should pay for laundry
service for the coveralls and the related question of Fiberfrax
contamination.

[R. 338-340].

The Commission ordered "that the

employers shall provide, at no cost to its employees, laundry
service for the protective coveralls that have been exposed to
Fiberfrax as specified in the Material Safety Data Sheet."

Order

Granting Motion For Review at 5 [R. 340]. These were issues that
were not plead in the September 3, 1991 Citation And Notification
Of Penalty that initiated this action.

[R. 001-003].

In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.. 680 P.2d 733,
736 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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It is error to adjudicate issues not raised
before or during trial and unsupported by the
record. Curran v. Mount, Ala., 657 P.2d 389
(1980). The trial court is not privileged to
determine matters outside the issues of the
case, and if he does, his findings will have
no force and effect. Brantley
v. Carlsbad
Jrr. Dist.,
92 N.M. 280, 587 P.2d 427 (1978).
In law or in equity, a judgment must be
responsive to tre issues framed by the
pleadings, and a i/ial court has no authority
to render a decision on issues not presented
for determination.
Any findings rendered
outside the issues are a nullity. Matter of
Estate
of Hurlbutt,
36 Or.App. 721, 585 P.2d
724 (1978); Credit
Investment
Guarranty
Bank and Trust
Co.,

and Loan Co. v.
166 Colo. 471,

444 P.2d 633 (1980). A court may not grant
judgment for relief which is neither requested
by the pleadings nor within the theory on
which the case was tried, whether that theory
was expressly stated or implied by the proof
adduced.

Leonard

Farms v. Carlsbad

Riverside

Terrace,
90 N.M. 34, 559 P.2d 411 (1977).
Parties may limit the scope of the litigation
if they choose, and if an issue is clearly
withheld, the court cannot nevertheless
adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief.
Wineglass

Ranches,

Inc.

v.

Campbell,

12 Ariz.

App. 571, 473 P.2d 496 (1970); La Bellman
Gleason

& Sanders,

Inc.,

v.

Okl., 418 P.2d 949

(1980).
The principals

stated

in Combe are equally

applicable to a

reviewing tribunal such as the Commission.
The Commission clearly embraced issues that were not raised in
the Citation And Notification Of Penalty.

The laundry services

portion of the Order Granting Motion For Review was apparently
based on the Material Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") submitted via
affidavit to the ALJ prior to the hearing. [R. 116, 423-424].
However, no material evidence was presented that Fiberfrax in any
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quantity was present in areas where it was exposed to temperatures
in excess of 1800 degrees fahrenheit, the point at which the
material

could

undergo

partial

conversion

to

crystobalite,

requiring special caution in conjunction with their use.
49, 121].

[R. 148-

The ALJ, if he considered that evidence at all,

considered it only as it related to the coveralls being "uniquely
personal." The Commission should not have decided the issue unless
it had been properly raised and the ALJ had the first opportunity
to address it. Smith v. Iverson, 848 P.2d 677, 677 (Utah 1982).
The Commission's order that Magcorp pay for laundry service
for the protective coveralls is completely without authority and
reason.

It admits to not even a modicum of propriety.
Sua Sponte decisions ... are inconsistent with
the notion of due process when parties are not
provided advance notice that the court is
considering a given course of action, and the
losing party is not allowed to be heard
thereon. "The right to prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard is a critical part of
our judical system. . . .A method of resolving
cases that by passes this requirement can not
be accepted as a fair, neutral, and rational
process."
Rubins,
813 P.2d at 780 (citing
Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct.
1011 (1970); see also Nelson v. Jacobson,
669
P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) ("Timely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard
in a meaningful way are at the very heart of
procedural fairness"). (footnote omitted).

Jenkins v. Weis. 230 U.A.R. 25, 31,

P.2d

(Utah App.

1994).
The Commission's laundry services payment decision was an
eggregious example of arbitrary and capricious action and otherwise
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ran afoul of Utah Code Ann,, § 63-46b-16(4). Magcorp requests this
court to reverse the laundry services portion of the Order Granting
Motion For Review.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider
UOSH,s Motion For Review because the motion was filed more than 30
days after the Order and Findings And Conclusions were signed by
the

ALJ

and

issued

by

the

Commission

on

June

10, IS,.;*

Accordingly, the Order Granting Motion For Review entered by the
Industrial Commission on December 17, 1992, and the Interim Order
Denying Motion To Dismiss are null and void.

In addition, the

Commissions Order Granting Extension Of Time entered after remand
was similarly entered without jurisdiction and erroneous as a
matter of law. Magcorp requests that those orders be declared void
for lack of jurisdiction and that the ALJ's June 10, 1992 order be
declared and remain the final judgment in this case.

I
In the alternative, should the court determine that the
Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter when it
issued its Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss and Order
Granting Motion For Review as well as the belated Order Granting
Motion For Extension Of Time on remand, Magcorp requests that the
case be remanded back to the P J to afford Magcorp a full hearing
on the merits of the issues raised in the Citation And Notification
Of Penalty and that the Commission's laundry services payment
decision that denied Magcorp notice and due process be reversed.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this c^O

day of February, 1994.

CONDER, WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS

srrald D. Conder
feter L. Rognlie
'Attorneys for Magcorp
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I,

Peter

February,

L.

1994, I

Rognlie, certify
served

2 copies

that
of

on
the

Appellee, upon Thomas C. Sturdy, counsel

the < ^ ^ T ~ d a y

of

attached

of

for the

Brief

Occupational

Safety and Health Division and Sharon J. Eblen, counsel for the
Industrial Commission of Utah, by mailing the copies to them by
first-class mail, with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following
address:
Thomas C. Sturdy, Esq.
Occupational Safety and Health Division
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
P. O. Box 146650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6650
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
P. 0. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
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Attorney>ror Magcorp
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Tab A

CITATION AND NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY
Douglas J. McVey, Administrator
Industrial Commission of Utah
Occupational Safety and Health Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 519870
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0870
(801)530-6901

-

Fax

530-6804

:9/3/91
Number 1105638639
:H4844

Issuance Date
Inspection
CSH0 I.D

Inspection Date

:7/30/91

-

8/9/91

Inspection Site

:Rowley, 84029

To: Magnesium Corp. of America
238 North 2200 West
Salt Lake City, UT. 84116

CITATION AND NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY: The violation(s) described in this Citation are alleged to have occurred
on or about the day the inspection was made unless otherwise indicated in the description given below.

This

citation (or copy) must be posted at or near the location of alleged violation. The citation must be posted
until the violation is corrected or abated or for 3 working days, whichever is longer. Assessed penalties are
payable to the Industrial Commission unless a notice of contest is mailed to the Administrator as indicated
below.
CONTESTS AND APPEALS:

Employers may request an informal review by the U0SH Administrator of any citation,

proposed penalty or abatement period. Employees may request an informal review of the abatement period granted
to the employer.

Informal reviews do not stay the 30 days in which an employer must file a contest for a formal

hearing before the Industrial Commission.
The Industrial Commission will provide an adjudicative hearing if an employer files a written notice of contest
with the Administrator within 30 days of receipt of the Citation or Proposed Penalties. Upon expiration of the
30 day period the Citation and Proposed Penalties are final and not subject to review by any court or agency.
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: Any employee or representative of employees who believes that the periods of time fixed for
correction or abatement of a violation is unreasonable has the right to contest the periods of time by
submitting a letter to the Administrator within 30 days of issuance of the citation.
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee filed a
complaint

with

the division,

instituted

any proceeding

with

the division,

conversed

with

a division

representative, or testified in any proceeding or exercised any right afforded under the act, standards or rules
of the division.

Any employee who suffers adverse working conditions based on the above must contact the

Administrator within 30 days.
CITED ITEMS BEGIN ON FOLLOWING PAGE, AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE AND TOTAL PENALTIES APPEAR ON FINAL PAGE.

>01

Oate Violation

Description

Penalty

Must Be Abated
The following are violations of the Utah Administrative Code and the
provisions of 29 CFR 1910 or 1926 which are incorporated by reference,
Utah specific standards begin with Utah General Safety Orders (UGSO)

The citation issued 8/27/91 is withdrawn
and reissued as follows:

SERIOUS
1

30 days from

29CFR 1910.132(a)

receipt of

$2,200

citation
Protective equipment, including personal protective equipment for eyes,
face, head, and extremities, protective clothing, respiratory devices,
and protective shields and barriers, shall be provided, used, and
maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever it is
necessary by reason of hazards of processes or environment, chemical
hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical irritants encountered in a
manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the function of any
part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact.
MOTE:

NFPA 480-2-1.6 requires operators in melting and casting areas

shall wear flame-resistant clothing, high foundry shoes, and adequate
face protection.
(A) Employees at Magnesium Corp., such as but not
limited to the Pot Hauler (CB), RAFO (Reactor
Auxiliary Feed Operator), Reactor Helper,
Smutters, Cell Service, Brickies, working with
and in the vacinity of molten material, were
not wearing flame resistive clothing.
(B) Employees at Magnesium Corp., were working with
and around molten material and not wearing flame
resistive clothing.

Most of these employees had

burn holes in their coveralls from the material
splashing, and some of them had on coveralls
that were brittle from the radiant heat.

The

coveralls they were wearing were made of 65%
cotton and 35% polyester.

ABATEMENT MOTE: Flame resistive clothing shall be provided and
maintained by the employer at no cost or financial expense to the
employee.

The Penalty of $2,700 will be waivered provided the penalty

is used towards the purchase of protective clothing, and documentation
is provided to UOSH.

00 )(

Description

Oate Violation
Must Be Abated

Penalty

OTHER
30 days from

1
UGSO R500-405-558.2.7

$ 500

receipt of
citation

Solid decking shall be provided where a hazard exists of free flowing
hot material falling from one floor to another.
(A) Floor decking at Mag. Corp. such as, but not
limited to the reactor building around the
launder, where molten material could fall
from floor to floor was not solid decking
to eliminate the hazard of free flowing hot
material

Penalty

$2,700

Authorized signature

0Q;n3

TabB

JERRALD D. COLDER (#0709)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Respondent
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Fax: (801) 967-5563
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection Number 105638639
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
BY AND THROUGH THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DIVISION,

)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Complainant,
vs.
i Administrative Judge:
1 Donald L. George

MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Respondent.

Magnesium

Corporation

of America's

(Magcorp) Motion

for

Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on the 17th day of
April, 199 2, the Honorable Donald L. George presiding.

Magcorp

was represented by counsel, Jerrald D. Conder and Michelle J.
Ivie.

Thomas

C.

Sturdy

appeared

Occupational Safety and Health

on

behalf

Commission.

of

the

Utah

Having reviewed the

pleadings on file regarding the above-referenced motion and the
Court having heard argument from each of the parties thereon, and
being fully advised in the premises, now makes its Finding of
Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

00t£3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on August 27, 1991 Magcorp receivd a citation and

notice of penalty

for

failure

to require

the use

of

flame

resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and reactor
sections of the facility in violation of 29 CFR 1910.132.
2.

That the citation and notice of penalty contained the

following note:
NOTE:

3.
codified

NFPA 480-2-1.6 requires operators in melting
and casting areas shall wear flame resistant
clothing, non-foundry shoes and adequate
face protection.

That UOSHA agreed that NFPA 480-2-1.6 has not been
into

the

Utah

Administrative

Code

or

other

UOSHA

regulations pertaining to personal protective equipment.
4.

A material issue of disputed fact exists with regard to

whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 by not requiring the use
of flame resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and
reactor sections of the facility.
5.

That the citation received by Magcorp

contained an

abatement order requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame
resistant protective equipment required under the citation and
notice of penalty.
6.

That the personal protective equipment at issue herein,

to wit, coveralls, are uniquely

personal

to each

individual

employee at Magcorp since the coveralls are individually fitted

-2-

to the employee, many bear the name of the individual employee,
and the coveralls are the type of garment that may be used by
employees away from the Magcorp facility.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That this court has jurisdiction over the parties in the

above-entitled matter.
2.

That disputed material issues of fact exist with regard

to whether Magcorp is in compliance with the requirements of 29
CFR 1910.132(a) and Summary Judgment on that issue is therefore
denied.
3.

That based upon the holding in Budd Co. v. OSHRC and

Federal OSHA Mandate, UOSHA has no legal or other authority to
impose the cost of uniquely personal protective equipment, such
as the coveralls at issue herein, upon Magcorp.
4.

That the Abatement Order contained in the UOSHA citation

to Magcorp requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame resistant
coveralls

purportedly

required

under

29

CFR

1910.132(a)

is

unenforceable and void as a matter of law.
5.

Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Magcorp on the

issue of cost allocation under 29 CFR 1910.132(a).

DATED this /Qjffiflay of

JUj^t

, 1992.

Approved as t o Form:

IAAAAQ (
Thomas C. Sturdy

(QM$\
\)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of Mayf

1992, I

caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to the following:
Thomas C. Sturdy
Industrial Commission of Utah
Division of Legal Affairs
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
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JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Respondent
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Fax: (801) 967-5563
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection Number 105638639
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
BY AND THROUGH THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DIVISION,

O R D E R

Complainant,
vs.
Administrative Judge:
Donald L. George

MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Respondent.
Based

upon

the

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions

of

law

entered herein, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Magcorp f s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on

the issue of cost allocation for personal protective equipment
required under 29 CFR 1910.132, and the abatement note contained
in the citation and notice of penalty issued in connection with
inspection no. 105638639, which required Magcorp to provide flame
resistant coveralls to Magcorp employees at no cost or financial
expense to the employees is void and unenforceable as a matter of
law.

oot1?**

2. That disputed issues of material fact exist with regard
to whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 and summary judgment
on this issue is denied.
DATED this ffljjday of

vjjJU^Z

JT

, 1992

BY THE COURT

Passed by the Industrial Conalssioa
of Utchj Salt Lake City, Utah, thi«

/aZOzzy of

(^,~-~< >

» 19 9%~

W * r : ^)r0 ,4^/>
Commission Secretary i

£.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Thomas C.

Sturdy

^VwvVI

•2-

00/7*/
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection No. 105638639
Industrial Commission of Utah
*
by and through the Occupational *
Health and Safety Division,
*
*

Complainant,
vs.

*
*

INTERIM ORDER
DENYING MOTION
TO DISMISS

*

Magnesium Corporation of
America,
Respondent.

*
*
*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complainant's Motion for Review
of the administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dated June 10, 1992.
The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 3 5-9-12,
and Section 63-46b-12.
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June 10,
1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium Corporation of
America (respondent or Magcorp) on the issue of whether the
Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Industrial
Commission of Utah (UOSH) could place the cost of providing flame
resistant coveralls for its employees on the respondent.
The
citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH required the
respondent to provide flame resistent coveralls to its employees at
no cost. The ALJ issued an order of summary judgment finding that
the citation was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. The
ALJ further found that there were disputed issues of material fact
on the issue of whether the respondent violated 29 CFR 1910.132 for
its failure to require the use of flame resistent protective
clothing in the electrolytic and reactor sections of its facility.
Although the order of the ALJ was signed on June 10, 1992, the
mailing certificate shows that the order was mailed on June 16,
1992. The UOSH filed a motion for review on July 16, 1992 pursuant
to 63-4 6b-12 seeking review of the order of summary judgment. The
respondent filed a motion to dismiss UOSH's motion for review for
untimeliness.
The respondent asserts that the ALJ's order was "issued" on June
10, 1992 because the order was executed in front of the party's
attorneys and because Mr. Conder, attorney for Magcorp was
personally served a copy of the order on that date. Mr. Conder
then offered a copy of the order to Mr. Sturdy, counsel for UOSH.
Mr. Sturdy declined Mr. Conder's offer of a copy of the order. No
certificate of service was executed on June 10, 1992 when the order
was delivered to Mr. Conder.
As of June 16, 1992, Mr. Sturdy had not received a copy of the
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order and requested a copy from the adjudication division.
He
received his copy of the order and a mailing certificate was
executed on June 16, 1992. Subsequently, UOSH filed its motion for
review on July 16, 1992. The respondent asserts that the motion
for review was untimely filed and asks that it be dismissed.
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the question of when an
order constituting final agency action is issued. Wiggins v. Board
of Review, 178 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992) . In Wiggins,
the court held that "'issue' as used in section 63-46b-14 (3) (a)
means the date the agency action is properly mailed as accurately
evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or personally served."
This definition of "issue" can legitimately be applied to 63-46b12, the section of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which
governs agency review of adjudicative proceedings.
This case involves an agency order which was signed and personally
delivered to the respondent on June 10, 1992 without preparation of
a mailing certificate. The complainant received the order with a
mailing certificate which shows an issuance date of June 16, 1992.
The date of issuance of an agency decision must be certain,
otherwise the jurisdiction of the agency or court to review an
agency order will be uncertain.
In this case, the confusion over the date of issuance stems from
the adjudication division's failure to properly prepare a
certificate of mailing and place its order in the mail on the date
the order was hand delivered to the respondent. However, to rule
that the order was issued on June 10, 1992 when the certificate of
mailing shows that the order was mailed on June 16, 1992 will
unfairly prejudice the complainant who relied on the date on the
mailing certificate in submitting its motion for review.
The
normal practice of the commission is to issue its orders by mail,
therefore, we believe that the order was not properly "issued" on
June 10, 1992 even though it was hand delivered to the respondent
on that date.
An order of the commission will not be considered
to have been "issued" until the date it is mailed or hand delivered
to the parties accompanied by a properly executed mailing
certificate or certificate of service. The date on the mailing
certificate or certificate of service will be considered to be the
date the order was "issued" by the commission. We believe that
this approach is consistent with the recent opinion of the Utah
Court of Appeals in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 178 Utah Adv. Rep.
29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for review of the complainant in
this matter was timely filed based upon the date of issuance of the
order as reflected on the mailing certificate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall be given 15
days from the date of mailing of this order to file a response to
the complainant's motion for review, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated section 63-46b-12.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

o :&*&

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the INTERIAM
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS in the case of Industrial
Commission of Utah BY AND THROUGH THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DIVISION v.s MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Case Number
105638369, on y^A. day of ^D&£&-£*-^.
, isf-R
to the
following:
JERRALD D. CONDER, ATTORNEY
4057 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY UTAH 84120
THOMAS STURDY, ATTORNEY
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
(intra-office mail)
DONALD L. GEORGE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
(intra-office mail)
JAY W. BAGLEY
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
(intra-office mail)

r/tikjfo&Z
Adell Butler-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel's Office
Industrial Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection No. 105638639
Utah Occupational
Health and Safety Division,

*
*
*

Complainant,
vs.

*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
REVIEW

*
*

Magnesium Corporation of
America,
Respondent.

*
*
*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the
Complainant's Motion for Review of the administrative law judge's
(ALJ) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated June 10,
1992. The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 359-12, and Section 63-46b-12.
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June
10, 1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium
Corporation of America ("respondent11 or "Magcorp11) on the is^ue of
whether the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the
Industrial Commission of Utah ("UOSH") could place the cost of
providing flame resistant coveralls for its employees on \the
respondent. The citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH
required the respondeat to provide flame resistent coveralls to its
employees at no cost.
The ALJ issued an order granting the
respondent/s motion for summary judgment finding that the citation
was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. On April 28, 1992,
Magcorp withdrew its objection to the citation and tendered payment
of the penalty due under the citation. Respondent's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, Exhibit C.
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act ("UOSHA") provides
that the commission is "empowered to administer all laws and lawful
orders to ensure that every employee in this state has a workplace
free of recognized hazards."
U.C.A. sec. 35-9-4 (1988).
The
commission has the "authority to assess all civil penalties
provided in this section, giving due consideration to the
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the
business of the employer charged, the gravity of the violation, the
good faith of the employer, and the history of any previous
violations by the employer."
I. WAS THE COST OF THE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
REQUIRED BY UOSH PROPERLY ALLOCATED TO THE
RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYEES?
The ALJ relied on Budd Co. v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201 (1975) in
ruling that the UOSH has no "legal or other authority to impose the
cost of uniquely personal equipment, such as the coveralls herein,
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upon Magcorp." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3, June
10, 1992. Budd held that 29 CFR 1910.132(a) did not mandate that
employers bear the cost of protective footwear required by the
regulation.
29 CFR 1910.132(a) provides that:
Protective equipment, including personal protective
equipment [flPPEM ] for eyes, face, head, and extremities,
protective clothing, respiratory devices, and protective
shields and barriers, shall be provided, used and
maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever
it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or
environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or
mechanical irritants encountered in a manner capable of
causing injury or impairment in the function of any part
of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical
contact (emphasis added).
29 CFR sec. 1910.132.
Subpart (b) provides that "where employees provide their own
protective equipment, the employer shall be responsible to assure
its adequacy, including proper maintenance, and sanitation of such
equipment." Id. In a footnote, the OSH Commission noted:
We do not imply that an employer is not obliged to bear
the cost of things such as capital equipment which it is
ordinarily his responsibility to assume.
We are here
considering the cost allocation of personal equipment.
. . . Thus, the most universally used type of protection
[steel toed shoes] is uniquely personal and may be used
by the employee when he is away from the job (emphasis
added).
Id. n. 5.
A U.S. Department of Labor memorandum dated August 9, 1985,
discussed the issue of cost allocation for PPE. The memorandum
stated that it will be the position of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration that 29 CFR 1910.132 will be interpreted as
follows:
PPE that is uniquely personal, and which the employees
may well use away from the job, is the type that an
employer may require employees to pay for. Exactly who
pays for this kind of PPE is a question to be resolved
between the employer and his employees—it is an
appropriate subject for collective bargaining. . . . as
a broad guideline, we can conclude that an employee may

00337

Magnesium Corp, of America
Order
Page three
be required to pay for PPE that he alone will use, is of
a personal nature, and may be used away from the job.
OSHA Memorandum, August 9, 1985.
Thus, the question at issue is whether the flame resistant
coveralls required by UOSH are the type of PPE which is uniquely
personal to the wearer.
The UOSH asserts that the coveralls at issue are not uniquely
personal to the wearer as are the steel toed shoes in Budd. The
coveralls are sized like men's suits, i.e. 40, 42, etc., and many
bear the employee's name. The UOSH asserts that the coveralls are
contaminated with Fiberfrax, a carcinogenic ceramic fiber and
should not be worn home prior to being laundered. The Material
Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") for Fiberfrax specifies in relevant part
that:
. . . ceramic fiber should be handled with caution. The
handling practices described in this MSDS must be
strictly followed . . . It is recommended that full body
clothing should be worn to reduce the possibility of skin
irritation. Washable or disposable clothing may be used.
Do not take unwashed work clothing home. Work clothes
should be washed separately from other clothing. Rinse
washing machine thoroughly after use. If clothing is to
be laundered by someone else, inform launderer of proper
procedure clothes and street clothes should be kept
separate to prevent contamination (emphasis added).
MSDS at 6.
The UOSH argues that the coveralls in question are not safe to
be taken home or stored with other clothes without having first
been laundered and therefore are not appropriate to be worn away
from work. We agree that the MSDS requirements for laundering and
sequestering contaminated clothing, make the coveralls more unique
to the workplace than the individual employee. Magcorp has made
coin operated laundry facilities available to its employees in
order to address this concern. We believe that this response is
inadequate to properly provide for the safety of Magcorp employees.
The sizing of the coveralls in this case can be distinguished
from the sizing of the shoes in Budd. Shoes, by their nature
adjust and conform to the foot of the wearer becoming "uniquely
personal" to the wearer.
Coveralls, do not generally become
"broken in" like a pair of shoes. The fit of a pair of coveralls
is much less personal and unique than a pair of steel toed shoes.
The coveralls may not be worn away from the workplace in the same
manner as steel toed shoes because they are contaminated with
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carcinogenic ceramic fibers.
Due to the contamination, the
coveralls must be laundered separately from other clothing and must
be laundered before taking them home. We believe that PPE which an
employee cannot readily wear home cannot realistically be
considered "uniquely personal11 to the employee.
The fact that the coveralls have the employee's name
embroidered on them does not, in and of itself, make the coveralls
uniquely personal to the wearer.
Names on uniforms and work
clothes can easily and inexpensively be changed to identify a new
wearer. We do not believe that the sizing of the coveralls makes
them unique to the wearer. Coveralls sized like men's suits could
easily be shared among several employees as long as they are of the
approximate same size. We therefore find that the flame resistant
coveralls required by UOSH in Magcorp's "hot end" are not uniquely
personal and that the cost of the coveralls should properly be
borne by the employer.
II. WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER IN THIS CASE?
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.
In the present case, the ALJ held a hearing on Magcorp's
motion for summary judgment, heard argument and examined the
coveralls at issue. The ALJ then found that the coveralls were
uniquely personal protective equipment and concluded as a matter of
law that the cost of the coveralls could be placed on the employees
under the reasoning in Budd. The ALJ then issued findings of fact,
conclusions of law and an order granting Magcorp's. motion for
summary judgment.
We don't believe that the order in this case should properly
be classified as one of summary judgment because there were
disputed questions of fact argued before the judge.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for review of the
complainant in this matter is hereby granted. For the reasons
stated above, we find that the cost of the flame resistant
coveralls required by UOSH should properly be allocated to the
employer.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall provide, at no
cost to its employees, laundry service for the protective coveralls
that have been exposed to Fiberfrax as specified in the Material
Safety Data Sheet.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs for preparing a transcript for appeals purposes.

(Colleen S« Col ton
Commissioner
I abstain because of prior discussion with
possibly related to the issues in this j^ase.

J

corp officials

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Certified this J7tP
ATTEST:

^^iA^-^^j

day oi/d^s^L^J

1992

(D yr^yl.

Patricia 0. Asliby
Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on
I mailed the
attached Order Granting Motion for Review in the case of UtahOccupational Health and Safety Division v. Magnesium Corporation of
America first class postage prepaid, to the following:
Jerrald D. Conder, Esq.
CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorney for Magcorp
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Thomas C. Sturdy, Esq.
Attorney for UOSH
(hand delivered)
Donald L. George, Esq.
Administrative Law Judge
(hand delivered)

Sharon J. E b ^ n , Attorney
Industrial Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UOSH Inspection No. 105638639
Industrial Commission of Utah
*
by and through the Occupational *
Health and Safety Division,
*
*

Complainant,
vs.

*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME

*

Magnesium Corporation of
America,
Respondent.

*
*
*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews the
Complainant's Motion for Extension of Time pursuant to the limited
order of remand issued by the Court of Appeals on April 29, 1993.
On June 10, 1992 Judge Donald L. Georgev ("ALJ") issued an
order dismissing a citation issued by the Utah Occupational Safety
and Health Division ("UOSH") in connection with UOSH inspection
number 105638639.
The citation assessed a fine for the
Respondent's failure to provide flame retardant coveralls pursuant
to 29 CFR 1910.132. At the time of the citation, the respondent
required its employees to pay for flame retardant coveralls to be
used in the workplace. The ALJ found that the citation was void
and unenforceable as•a matter of law. On Motion for Review, the
Commission reversed the ALJ and ruled that the employer should
provide the flame retardant coveralls.
The Commission's Order was appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Court remanded the matter to the Commission for a
determination whether UOSH showed good cause for an extension of
time to file its motion for review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b1(9). Our prior orders have not addressed the issue of good cause
for an extension of time because no extension was originally
requested. Under the law in existence at the time UOSH filed its
motion for review, the motion was timely filed.
DISCUSSION
1. GOOD CAUSE
UOSH asserts that it relied in good faith on Wiggins v. Board
of Review1 when it filed its motion for review.
UOSH further
asserts that both Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n2 and Bonded

1

824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992).

2

199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992).
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Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec.,3 were decided after UOSH
filed its motion for review on July 16, 1992.
The UOSH motion for review was filed thirty days from the date
the ALJ's Order was mailed relying upon the January 23, 1992
decision of the Court of Appeals in Wiggins. Wiggins held that the
date an agency order is issued is the date the order is mailed as
evidenced by the mailing certificate. On October 30, 1992, the
Utah Supreme Court held that an agency order is issued on the date
the order bears on its face, and not the date of mailing. Dusty / s
at 9.
On December 4, 1992, the Court of Appeals in Bicycle
Couriers, held that Dusty's overruled Wiggins.
Magcorp asserts that UOSH has not shown good cause to justify
an extension of time under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(flUAPAff) .
Magcorp further asserts that the time for filing a
motion for review is jurisdictional under Varian Eimac v.
Lamoreaux4 and that there is no specific statutory provision which
allows the Commission to extend the time for filing a motion for
review.
We believe that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) clearly authorizes the
Commission to grant an extension of time for filing a motion for
review for good cause shown. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial
Commission..5
UAPA provides that an "aggrieved party may file a
written request for review within 3 0 days after the issuance of an
order..."6 and that an agency may extend the time limits provided
for good cause shown.7 Maverik filed a motion for Commission
review of an administrative order one day late.
The Court of
Appeals recognized that, "absent
a showing
of good cause
for an
extension, the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 requires,
as a prerequisite to the agency taking jurisdiction over a review,
actual delivery of the necessary documents to the agency within the
thirty day time period." Maverick at 37. (emphasis added).
We conclude that the UOSH motion for review was timely filed
under the law in effect at the time of filing and that no extension
3

201 Ut. Adv. Rep. (Ct. App. 1992).

4

767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989),

5

214 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1993).

6

U.C.A. § 63-46b-12(l)(a).

7

The agency may extend "any time period prescribed in this
chapter, except those time periods prescribed for judicial review."
U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9).
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of time was necessary. However, we also hold that if an extension
of time is required then the subsequent change in the law
constitutes good cause for an extension of time.
2. APPLICABILITY OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Magcorp asserts that Rule 6 U.R.C.P. applies to the equation
pursuant to Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P., and requires that UOSH show
excusable neglect before an extension of time may be granted by the
Commission. A showing of excusable neglect is not required. UOSH
relied on the law in effect at the time of filing, so it is not
necessary to show excusable neglect.
We believe that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply
to agency actions under UAPA unless UAPA provides otherwise. In
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965), the
Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e) and Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P.
could be applied to administrative procedures "except insofar as
such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable." The Griffith
Court held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applied to extend the time for
filing a petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail.
Although footnote 1 in Lamoreaux opines that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P.
applies to extend the time for filing a motion for review, this
position was discarded by the Court of Appeals in Maverik.8
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court noted that ,f[w]hile the mode
of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil procedure in

the trial courts are not necessarily

applicable

to

administrative

proceedings.
See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) ....
Thus, administrative
proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
unless the governing statute or regulations so provide." Pilcher
v. Dep't of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 (Utah 1983) (emphasis
added). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative
proceedings in Utah.
The UAPA provides

in relevant part, "except

provided by a statute
superseding
specific
reference
to this chapter,
apply to every agency
1(1) (1989) (emphasis
that the Utah Rules of
proceedings.
To the

as otherwise

provisions
of this chapter
by
the provisions of this chapter

of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. § 63-46badded). The UAPA does not generally state
Civil Procedure apply to all administrative
contrary, the UAPA contains only limited,

214 U t . Adv. Rep.

34,

36-37

( C t . App.

1993).
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specific references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure9.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The ALJ's Order was issued on June 10, 1992 and mailed to
the parties on June 16, 1992.
2. The Utah Division of Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH)
Motion for Review was filed with the Commission on July 16, 1992.
3. Under the January 23, 1992 order in Wiggins v. Board of
Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992), an agency order was
considered issued on the date it was mailed.
4. The Commission relied on the Wiggins decision in its
Interim Order of October 9, 1992 which held that the UOSH motion
for review was timely filed.
5. The law regarding the issuance of agency orders was changed
by the October 30, 1992 Order of the Utah Supreme Court in Dusty's
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992).
Under Dusty's, an order is considered issued on the date the order
bears on its face.
6. The UOSH relied in good faith on the Wiggins decision in
filing its motion for review on July 16, 1992.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Wiggins was the law in effect at the time UOSH filed its
motion for review. We believe that UOSH's reliance on the law at
the time of filing is good cause to support the grant of an
extension of time for filing.

9

See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (providing that Rules 12(b) and
56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to dismiss or for summary judgment
except to the extent that those rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A.
§ 63-46b-7 (providing that the rules of discovery under the
U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not enacted rules for discovery);
U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that a defaulted party may file a
motion to set aside a default order under the procedures outlined
in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(2) (providing that a petition
for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be
a complaint governed by the U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings
and proceedings in the district court are governed by the
U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-19(l)(c) (providing that the venue for
proceedings to enforce agency orders is governed by the
requirements of the U.R.C.P.).
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We conclude that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to agency actions under UAPA unless expressly adopted under
UAPA, Therefore, UOSH must merely show good cause for an extension
under UAPA and does not need to meet the requirements of Rule 6 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the complainant in this matter is
hereby granted an extension of time in which to file a motion for
review of the June 10, 1992 order of the administrative law judge.
DATED this

^0

day of

(DcJTJ^

1993.

h
\s~*

If

ya^

u

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

^ ^

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
I abstain because of prior discussion with Magcorp officials
possibly related to the issues in this case,

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
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I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME in the case ofMAGNESIUM
CORPORATION, Case Number 105638639, on/^/9 day of
(i^^Z^C^i
19^-^to the following:

THOMAS C. STURDY, ATTORNEY FOR
UTAH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JERRALD D. CONDER
PETER L. ROGNLIE
CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH

84120

DONALD L. GEORGE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell Butlesf-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel/s Office
Industrial Commission of Utah
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35-9-12. Procedure for review of order entered by administrative law judge — Continuing jurisdiction of
commission.
(1) The functions and duties of the commission shall be those quasi-judicial
functions listed in this chapter.
(2) Every official act of the commission shall be entered of record and irs
hearings and; records shall be open to the public.
(3) (a) Administrative law judges appointed by the commission shall hear
and determine any proceeding assigned to them by the commission.
(b) The administrative law judge shall enter his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order not later than 30 days after final receipt of all
matters concerned in the hearing.
(c) Thejfindings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the administrative law judge shall become the final order of the commission unless
objections! are made in accordance with Subsection (4).
(4) (a) Any;party of interest who is dissatisfied with the order entered by
an administrative law judge may obtain a review by the commission, by
filing a motion for review with the commission in accordance with Section
63-46b-12.
(b) The commission may affirm, modify, remand, or overrule the order
of the administrative law judge.
(c> The decision of the commission is final unless judicial review is
requested in accordance with Section 63-46b-14.
(d) To the extent that new facts are provided, the commission has continuing jurisdiction to amend, reverse, or enhance prior orders.
History: L. 1973, ch. 69, § 12; 1981, ch. 1,
§ 4; 1985, ch. 161, § 6; 1987, ch. 161, § 116;
1989, ch. 265, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 19S9 amendment, effective April 24, 1989. deleted former
Subsections <1> to (3» relating- to the creation,
offices and meetings, and personnel of the
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission and redesignated former Subsections (4) to ' 7 ' as Subsections 1 > to !4>; deleted
"review'' before ''commission" throughout the
section; deleted former Subsection <5"b) which
read "The review commission may adopt rules
for the orderly conduct of business that are
consistent with the Industrial Commission's
Rules"; substituted "the commission"' for ''a review commissioner" at the end of Subsection

(3Ha); substituted "enter" for "transmit" End
"order" for "a recommended order to the review
commission" in Subsection c'3 »• b»: deleted "recommended" before "order" and substituted "administrative law judge" for "hearing examiner" and "Subsection i 4 f for "Subsection
in Subsection '3><c : substituted "commis.-. .:•
in accordance with Section 63-46b-12" for "---:retary of the review commission" at the enc of
Subsection (4)(a>; rewrote Subsection »4 bwhich read ''The review commission may adopt
the recommended order, modify the order, or
refer the matter to the hearing examiner for
further proceedings"; added "in accordar.ee
with Section 63-46b-14" to Subsection <4• <:•:
and added Subsection (4Hd>.
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63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the. agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule,
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party.
,~, TTitiim JLU uays 01 me mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the
response. One copy of the response shall be seni by mail to each of the parties
and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the
agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on
review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each pf the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties: and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 268; 1988, ch. 72, § 22.
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §5 59-1-601, 59-1-610.
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Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.

TabK

Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement
of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement.

